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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Does the District Court have jurisdiction to order restitution 
requested by the victim after the successful termination of probation. 
DIFFERENCES IN STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State's rendition of the facts is essentially the same as the one entered 
by the Appellant. With the exception that they failed to mention that the County 
Attorney had filed an Affidavit of Restitution for the victim in the amount of 
$495.40. The State is correct in stating that Defendant did not object to this 
amount, and that was the amount of restitution that he paid in compliance with 
the court's order. 
When Adult Probation and Parol (hereinafter AP&P) on September 8, 
1998, filed its progress report, they maintained that Appellant had successfully 
completed all the requirements of his probation and requesting that Defendant's 
probation be terminated satisfactorily. This meant that he had paid all the 
restitution, fines and fees that had been ordered by the court. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant contends that the District Court does not have the jurisdiction to 
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re-open restitution and to order a new amount of restitution for counseling that 
arose after the probationary period had ended and was not ordered or requested 
during the probationary period. 
STATE'S ARGUMENT 
I. 
The State basically argues that the judge did not terminate the probation 
because the initialing of the "APPROVED AND ORDERED" did no constitute 
an order or judgment. They cite to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(b) that 
states that "judgments must be signed" and Rule 4-403 of the Utah code of 
Judicial Administration. This Rule is titled "Signature Stamp Use" a reading of 
this Rule would seem to make it inapplicable to the case at bar since it gives 
direction to the judge and the clerk when the "stamp" may or may not be used or 
when the clerk may sign with permission. Appellant challenges whether Rule 
58A(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governs in this case either. 
Appellant contends that in this case the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
should govern since this is a criminal proceeding. Rule 1 of the Rules of 
Criminal Procedure (b) states:" These rules shall govern the procedure in all 
criminal cases in the state .... These rules are intended and shall be construed to 
secure simplicity of procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination of 
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unnecessary expense and delay." 
Rule 22 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure discusses all the ways things 
that a court must do when Sentence, Judgment and Commitment is entered. 
Nowhere in the rule is a "signature" discussed but instead imposes upon the court 
a requirement to "deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail". 
Rule 26 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure discusses all the times 
and ways an appeal may be affected in a criminal case. Again it does not require 
a "signature". 
Rule 30 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (b) states:" Clerical 
mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the 
record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any 
time and after such notice, if any, as the court may order." 
More to the point, under Utah law the only statute that governs termination 
of probation is in the Utah Code of Criminal Procedure: 77-18-1(10) Nowhere 
in this statute is a "signature" required for the termination of probation. 
The cases cited by the State to support their argument that a signature is 
required from Utah are all cases where the minute entry was used as a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. "Judgments, orders and minutes are facially 
distinguishable instruments, recognizable by their content, appearance and 
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substance, each of these writings has a distinct legal identity...Never a fit 
substitute for the judge's recordable memorialized entry, minutes are by 
definition incomplete." Manning v. State Ex Rel. Dept. of Public Safety, 876 
P.2d 667 (Okla. 1994) The entry on the Probation Report was not a "minute 
entry" and is distinguishable from the cases cited by the State. 
The Oklahoma cases cited by the State are not on point either because they 
both deal with initialed minute entries. (See Manning Id. and Martin v. Liberty 
Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma City. Okla.. 839 P.2d 179 (Okla. 1992) 
Further, Manning specifically rejects form over substance. The court ruled that 
the ruling of the court given before any other written documents were filed by the 
parties were entered was the judgment. "The content and substance of the 
January 13 entry is that of a judgment and not that of a minute. If the four 
corners yielded no more than an unsigned or initialed recitation of the events that 
transpired at trial, our conclusion might be different. The instrument in contest 
clearly vacates the driver's license revocation, judicially determining the parties 
rights in the action.... Our facial examination of this instrument does not reveal 
any indication that the judge intended a more complete instrument to follow." 
The State next argues that the AP&P document was not designed or 
intended to have legal effect of the rights and expectations of the parties. This 
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could not be further from the truth. The section at the end of the AP&P report 
clearly invites the judge to rule. The judge has the option to "Approve and 
Order" or Deny. It is of legal significance to note that this form is used when the 
probation it to be terminated successfully, unsuccessfully or revoked. If a 
probationer's rights to probation are to be revoked he must be given notice and a 
right to a hearing under Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 77-18-1 (10)(a)(iii). 
There are no provisions for any additional procedure for early release of 
probation. It is the form and substance of the entry that this be an Order from the 
judge releasing the probation. 
There are rulings from other states that signatures are not required in 
criminal cases. "Texas is one of those jurisdictions in which the failure of the 
judge to sign the judgment of conviction does not affect its validity." State v. 
Anderson. 408 P.2d 212, 213 (Or. 1965) Arizona has held that "an examination 
of [code sections] are convincing that the judgment in a criminal case must be 
rendered in open court and entered upon the minutes of the court, and that no 
other written judgment is required." State v. Smith. 433 P.2d 45,46 (Ariz. 1967) 
The State quotes the trial judge in the matter that "The standard procedure 
would be that we give notice to defense counsel and we sign a formal order 
terminating and we decide whether it's satisfactory or unsatisfactory. All I ever 
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did is authorize them to do that and they never did it. That's what the record 
would show." (See R. 92 and Respondent's Brief p. 5) Unfortunately what the 
judge thought is not what the record would show. The record would show that 
there is no notice to defense counsel or the prosecutor that AP&P and the Court 
had recommended termination successfully of Defendant's probation. Moreover, 
there is record that based upon the judge's signing with "OK, JRA" the 
APPROVED AND ORDERED line that AP&P terminated his probation. 
A review of all the criminal cases supervised by AP&P in Duchesne, in the 
Eighth District Court shows that of the twenty-three cases that were 
recommended terminated either successfully or unsuccessfully by AP&P of those 
case opened in 1995 and 1996 (the cases that are the same period as Appellant's 
and would be expiring by operation of law) that not one has an order prepared by 
the County Attorney's office. One has on order prepared by the defense counsel 
that sought early release of probation. (See State v. Rich Hopkins No. 961800009 
Eighth District Court) Fourteen have orders that appear to have been prepared by 
a non-attorney. They do not have any attorney's name, address or phone number 
on them as required on pleadings. They do not appear to have been prepared by 
the court itself. It is believed that they were prepared by AP&P's secretary. 
Eight of the files do not have any orders in them, but have only the "Approved 
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and Ordered" line signed with initials by either ALP for Judge A Lynn Payne or 
JRA for Judge John R. Anderson. ( See appendix for a listing of the cases 
found.) This does not include Appellant's case on appeal. That would mean nine 
of the twenty three cases or more than a third were not really off probation, if 
what the State argues is true. This is not what the Rules of Criminal Procedure 
are talking about in the words "These rules are intended and shall be construed 
to secure simplicity of procedure, fairness in administration, and the elimination 
of unnecessary expense and delay." (Rule 1 quoted earlier.) 
It would make a travesty of the provisions allowing an early release from 
probation by order of the court to hold that the Appellant was not released from 
probation by the judge's order on the back of the AP&P Report. 
II 
THE STATE ARGUES THAT THE COURT COULD ENFORCE 
JURISDICTION REGARDLESS OF THE DEFENDANT'S 
PROBATIONARY STATUS 
This argument ignores the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-
3-201 (1953 as amended) Part 4(c) of that Statute states: "In determining 
restitution, the Court shall detennine complete restitution and court ordered 
restitution, (i) complete restitution means the restitution necessary to 
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compensate a victim for all losses caused by the Defendant, (ii) court ordered 
restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the 
Defendant to pay as part of a criminal sentence at the time of sentencing, (iii) 
complete restitution and court ordered restitution shall be determined as provided 
in sub-section 8." If the court successfully terminated probation it had no power 
to order additional restitution. 
The State argues that Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-3-201 and Sec. 77-18-
l(10)(a)(ii) allow the court to "retain jurisdiction for the limited purpose of 
enforcing payment of... restitution." (Respondent's brief p. 10) Even this 
argument does not address the provisions of the statute. Sec. 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii) 
states: "If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, 
owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed costs, the court may retain 
jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation...." The 
court did not retain jurisdiction in this case because the Defendant did not owe 
any fines or restitution. He had paid all the restitution required of him in the 
Affidavit of Restitution filed by the County Attorney. He had not been asked to 
pay anything that he had not paid. (See AP&P Report) That was one of the 
reasons AP&P recommended his release from probation. 
In most ways this case is one of first impression. All the other cases in 
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Utah interpreting Utah Code Ann. Sec. 77-18-1 have dealt with the termination 
of probation as a matter of law under (10)(a)(i) as in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 
462 (Utah 1988) and Statev.Mova 815 P.2d 1312 (Ut. App. 1991) or where 
terminated for violation under (1 l)(a) as in State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Ut. 
App. 1992 and State v. Nones, 2000 UT App 21. 
This Court has held that a District Court has the authority to extend the 
probationary period under the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section 77-18-
1, that provides in part "at any time prior to the termination of probation the court 
may, after hearing with proper notice...extend probation for good cause shown." 
State v. Rollins, 893 P. 2d 1063, 1067 (Utah App. 1993). The court went on to 
state in that case "in order for a court to retain its authority over a probationer, 
who is not actively evading supervision, the probationer must be served with an 
Order to Show Cause within the period of probation. See Smith v. Cook, 803 
P.2d 788, 794 (Utah 1990). The court in Rollins went on to state "the same 
analysis is applicable to statutory prerequisites to commencement of probation 
extension proceedings. (Rollins at 1067) The court went on to hold in 
accordance with the holding in Smith, "the court loses jurisdiction over a 
probationer when probation extension proceedings are not properly commenced 
before the probation term expires." 
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The State cites State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah App. 1992). 
Appellant continues to argue that the facts in his case are distinguishable from 
those in Dickey. The Defendant in Dickey failed to make restitution payments 
as ordered and the statutory time for his probation ran. In the Appellant's case, 
he had paid the restitution as requested by the victim and as ordered by the Court 
and, therefore, had his probation successfully terminated as requested by Adult 
Probation and Parole. There was, therefore, no recorded judgment or hen against 
him that would continue in force after the expiration of the successful 
termination of his probation. 
The State argues that the Defendant's failure to object to the Court's order 
that he "pay total restitution to the victim for any counseling and all costs in 
connection therewith." (State's Brief p. 12) The State fails to understand the 
effect of the Affidavit of Restitution filed by the Prosection. This established the 
amount that Defendant, AP&P and the Court expected the restitution to be until 
the time that he was released from probation. 
The State also argues that Nones is controlling in this matter. Appellant 
argues that it is clearly distinguishable. It is clear from the facts in Nones that 
the trial court had retained jurisdiction over the restitution because she had not 
paid them during her probationary time. This is not the case in the Appellant's 
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matter. He paid the restitution that the victim, the prosecutor, AP&P and the 
Court asked him to pay. The court lost jurisdiction to increase the restitution 
when it terminated his probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the statutory provisions, and the 
inherent injustice and inequity in a Ruling that would allow the court to make 
rulings in a matter where they have lost jurisdiction, Appellant respectfully 
requests that the order entered by the Eighth Judicial District Court for restitution 
#e vacated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thisb^4ay of August, 2000. 
CINDYBARTON-COOMBS 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
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FILES FROM EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT 
State v. Mike Erickson No. 951800095 
Violation report- order denied 8/17/98 
State v. Jeremiah LeGrand Anderson No. 951800102 
Progress Violation Report Approved JRA 
Terminated from Probation- No Written Order 9/17/97 
State v. Donald Lee No. 951800103 
Order of Termination signed by JR Anderson 
drafted by AP&P 
State v.Daniel P. Norton 951800114, 951800118, 951800116 
Order of Termination 
drafted by AP&P Signed 3/10/97 
State v. Kerry Hafen No. 961800117 
Order of Termination 
drafted by AP&P Signed 10/18/99 
State v. Sandra Jean Klitz No. 951800123 
Order of Termination initialed JRA) 
drafted by AP&P 12/30/97 
State v. Carrell Lance Wilkerson No. 951800126 
P/V Report initialed Approved and Ordered JRA 11/17/970 
No Order 
State v. Kimberly Brundage No 951800130 
P/V Report Initialed Approved and Ordered JRA 10/19/98 
No Order 
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State v. Aaron Moon No. 951800131 
No P/V Order Terminating Probation Drafted by AP&P 
Signed 2/2/98 
State v. Kenneth Aired No. 951800137 
P/V Report signed and initialed by JRA 
Order Terminating Probation Drafted by AP&P 12/23/96 
State v. Rick Hopkins No. 961800009 
Defense Counsel requested early termination of probation 
and drafted Order Terminating Probation 11/8/96 
State v. LaMont Jed Ivie NO. 961800010 
Order Terminating Probation sent from 7th District AP&P 9/22/97 
State v. Michael Heimel No. 961800012 
P/V Report signed and approved by ALP 2/16/99 
No Order 
State v. Lorene Heimel No. 961800020 
P/V Report initialed by ALP 
Order terminating Probation drafted by AP&P 3/1/99 
State v. Sherry Lynne Ainge No. 961800036 
P/V Report initialed by JRA 5/1/00 
No Order 
State v. Jeffrey Dwayne Thies No. 961800045 
P/V Report 
Order Terminating Probation drafted by AP&P 8/31/98 
State v. Lincoln Lawrence Hatch No. 961800049 
P/V Report signed ALP 
Order Terminating Probation drafted by AP&P 7/6/97 
State v. Justin Cowley No. 961800051 
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P/V Initialed approved and Ordered ALP 5/22/00 
No Order 
State v. Ronald McClellan Nos. 951800119,961800071 
P/V Initialed approved and Ordered ALP 7/17/00 
No Order 
State v. Alonzo Jim H No 961800097 
P/V Report 
Order Terminating Probation drafted by AP&P 4/4/00 
State v. Blaine Uncasam No. 961800099 
P/V Report 
Order Terminating Probation drafted by AP&P 5/10/99 
State v. Gloria Jean Jim No. 961800101 
P/V Report 
Order Terminating Probation drafted by AP&P 12/22/97 
State v. Grant Simpson Black No. 961800119 
P/V Report Termination Approved and Ordered ALP 
No Order 9/20/98 
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